This book is a republication of the U.S. Navy's 1998 ofªcial account of its participation in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the buildup to and then the execution of the war to oust Iraqi forces from Kuwait, which they had occupied in August 1990. As such, it has all the virtues of ofªcial history: precision and completeness. It has the extra virtue of showing not only how vital the role of sea power was in the war but also how underappreciated its contribution has been. On the other hand, because this is ofªcial history it must avoid speculation. That is inevitable but unfortunate because the most important inºuence of sea power may well have been indirect. Sea power may have made the liberation of Kuwait possible in the most basic way. When the Iraqis invaded in 1990, Saddam Hussein tried to deter Saudi leaders from admitting Americans to help defend their kingdom. He proclaimed that it would be sinful for the Saudis to admit non-believers onto their sacred Arabian soila message later taken over by Osama bin Laden, and an ironic one for a determined secularist like Saddam. But because the United States had aircraft carriers deployed near Saudi Arabia, it was clear from the outset that a defense of Saudi Arabia could be erected (using the ships' aircraft) whether or not the Saudi government welcomed U.S. troops. Saddam's subversive argument was thereby rendered moot. The Saudis could feel free to accept U.S. troops, and ultimately it was those troops who liberated Kuwait. Given the poor quality of Saddam's army, it is conceivable that an assault made entirely from the sea could have been successful, but no one thought so at the time. Hence the vital importance of the Saudi base and also, most likely, the ability of the Saudis to veto any decisive operation to oust Saddam, although the question of just how and why the U.S. forces stopped short of Baghdad in 1991 remains murky.
Quite naturally it is not yet possible to conªrm the effect of the U.S. carriers. Edward Marolda and Robert Schneller do make the interesting point that those on the ground in Saudi Arabia tended to discount the effect of naval forces. Because so little infrastructure had been put into place, Air Force ªghters ºown to Saudi Arabia could not be considered particularly effective until months had passed. The air defense of the Kingdom really did rest on those carriers. Much the same can probably be said of the Marines, thanks to their pre-positioned (at sea) equipment. In contrast, Army units gradually moved into Saudi Arabia. In both cases, naval forces acted as a necessary shield for the buildup that led to success in early 1991.
For that matter, it was Western sea power that made the buildup possible. What many have forgotten-though Marolda and Schneller have not-is that there was a real fear that rulers sympathetic to Saddam Hussein, such as Muammar Qadafª in Libya, would try to slow or stop the buildup by interdicting shipping through the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal. Such actions had precedents, including Libya's mining of the Red Sea pilgrim route in 1984. What stopped any such effort this time was a combination of raw sea power (the Libyans had learned their lesson in April 1986, when U.S. naval aircraft bombed ground targets in Libya) and, probably, naval intelligence that would not only have detected any attempt at interdiction but would also have identiªed its source.
Sea power had other effects, and they are well described in the book. The extensive embargo, prosecuted by sea, made it difªcult for Saddam to repair gaps in his forces, notably in their air defenses. We can see the effect of the sustained embargo, continued after the 1991 ceaseªre, in the extremely limited capacity of Iraqi ground forces to confront their enemies in 2003. Marolda and Schneller also discuss how the presence of the Marines in 1991 compelled the Iraqis to divert major ground forces to face a potential amphibious assault (which was not, in the end, carried out). Ashore, the Marines contributed signiªcantly to victory on the ground, supported in part by aircraft from offshore. Carrier-based air attacks forced the Iraqis to defend over a far wider front than they otherwise would have-albeit with effects that, while obvious, are difªcult to quantify.
One might wonder why a journal devoted to Cold War history would review a book on the ªrst post-Cold War conºict, the 1991 Gulf War. There is, however, a clear logic here, and it is one that makes this an important Cold War book. Throughout the Cold War, one key question was what would happen if the standoff erupted into actual combat. Governments made their choices at least partly on the basis of what they thought might happen. For example, as long as Soviet leaders believed that an attack against Western Europe would be far too costly to attempt, they held back.
When Western governments believed they could not withstand a Soviet attack, they did their best to offer concessions that would keep Soviet and Warsaw Pact troops from moving west. In important ways the Gulf War was a miniature version of what would have happened if the Soviet Union had taken its chances and moved west.
The least-discussed aspect of such a potential war was the likely contribution of Western sea power. Analysts tended to concentrate on the probable character of a land battle on the Central Front. If they considered the naval contribution at all, it was in the form of guaranteeing the supply route across the Atlantic, without which the U.S. and West European ground forces would have run out of ammunition and other essentials. Skepticism about the security of the Atlantic supply line led to the creation of vast dumps of materiel in West Germany with which troops ºown directly from the United States would have mated. When the United States decided to assemble a rapid-reaction force for Southwest Asia in 1979, it took a similar approach. There was no question of stationing troops in-theater. For the most part, U.S. forces were stockpiled aºoat, on board Maritime Pre-positioning Ships. To a limited extent U.S. ofªcials apparently assumed that the Saudi government, by purchasing U.S. types of equipment, particularly aircraft, was assuring a basis for emergency operations by U.S. aircraft that could be ºown in to protect the Kingdom.
One might liken Saddam Hussein's seizure of Kuwait to an oft-discussed Cold War scenario, the "Hamburg grab," in which Soviet forces would seize valuable West German territory just over the border-and then stop. The longer the West waited to react, the more it would seem that the Western response was an entirely separate operation, which could be prevented by an active propaganda campaign. Inaction might well have shattered the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) because it would have demonstrated to West Europeans that the alliance was toothless. Yet the pause before reacting would have given the Soviet government an excellent opportunity to mobilize Western public opinion terriªed of a European war.
In the case of Iraq, one important virtue of sea power was that it could be applied without resorting to open hostilities-that is, the coalition governments could do something to begin to coerce Iraq before they resorted to open warfare. They imposed a naval embargo. In that way they kept the issue of Kuwait alive while building up ªrst to defend Saudi Arabia from further aggression and then deciding to liberate Kuwait militarily. Without the embargo, the seizure of Kuwait would have been in effect an uncontested fait accompli, and (as in the Hamburg grab scenario) any later operation to liberate Kuwait would have been seen widely as an entirely separate act of aggression. Quite possibly the only immediate counter to a Hamburg grab during the Cold War would have been maritime-for example, a campaign of interdiction against Soviet-bloc shipping. Western archives reveal discussions of maritime options to be taken in response to increased Soviet pressure on Berlin.
The quick arrival of Marines in Saudi Arabia in 1990 and early 1991 might also be likened to a Cold War option. By the 1980s plans called for U.S., British, and Dutch marines to move into place to reinforce Norwegian military units in wartime. Quick arrival was possible because some equipment had been pre-positioned, but also because naval forces are far more pre-packaged than their land-based counterparts:
Much of what they need is already on board their amphibious ships. The effect of landing troops in Norway would have been both to help secure the alliance's northern ºank and to present a threat the Soviet Union would have had to counter. Advocates of such pressure argued that the forces the Soviet Union would have deployed to counter mobile NATO marines in the north would have been subtracted from whatever was available for the Central Front. Saddam Hussein's diversion of troops from the Saudi border to face the sea might be considered analogous.
Similarly, it might be argued that the combination of carrier and land-based air attacks on Iraq recalled an important Cold War fact of life. If the Soviet Union had faced only a land-based air threat, Soviet air defenses could have been concentrated over a relatively narrow axis. Political pressure, moreover, might well have been employed to reduce the threat from West European bases and thereby further limit the defended sector. Naval air and cruise missile threats made any such concentration pointless because they could be mounted over a wide arc. They also probably made the high cost of trying to eject NATO tactical aircraft from Europe a pointless political expense-with an echo in the effect of the carriers on Saudi ofªcial attitudes.
All of these analogies can be taken too far. However, they do provide useful insights into the character and uses of sea power in wars, like the Cold War, which are often seen almost exclusively in ground contexts. There is one ªnal irony. In one respect the Gulf War was unlike any extension of the Cold War. The U.S. tactics had been adapted from Soviet ideas of deep battle. At the time, observers suggested that Iraq's defensive tactics were actually adapted from old British concepts typical of the NATO of the 1970s. So perhaps the U.S. success in Kuwait implied that Soviet troops would have done rather well had they pushed west in the 1970s. 
Reviewed by Arthur Jay Klinghoffer, Rutgers University
Since the Six-Day War in June 1967, the United States and Israel have had a close relationship, including extensive U.S. military and economic support for the Jewish state. However, is it possible that 1967 may represent not a distinct turning point but the culmination of a gradual process? Warren Bass, a historian who served as associate editor of Foreign Policy, responds in the afªrmative as he traces the evolution of U.S.-Israeli ties during the Kennedy administration and convincingly demonstrates that the seeds of an alliance had been planted earlier in the decade. Israel had sought a strategic relationship with the United States since the early 1950s but, after having been rebuffed by Dwight Eisenhower, it started to ªnd support from John F. Kennedy, who proffered security guarantees and armaments.
Bass portrays the Eisenhower administration as "the least pro-Israel presidency in American history" (p. 48). He argues that Eisenhower sought Arab backing for his
